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Abstract
What happens when the Supreme Court of the United States decides a case
impacting one or more publicly-traded firms? While many have observed
anecdotal evidence linking decisions or oral arguments to abnormal stock
returns, few have rigorously or systematically investigated the behavior of
equities around Supreme Court actions. In this research, we present the first
comprehensive, longitudinal study on the topic, spanning over 15 years and
hundreds of cases and firms. Using both intra- and interday data around
decisions and oral arguments, we evaluate the frequency and magnitude of
statistically-significant abnormal return events after Supreme Court action.
On a per-term basis, we find 5.3 cases and 7.8 stocks that exhibit abnormal
returns after decision. In total, across the cases we examined, we find 79 out
of the 211 cases (37%) exhibit an average abnormal return of 4.4% over a
two-session window with an average |t|-statistic of 2.9. Finally, we observe
that abnormal returns following Supreme Court decisions materialize over the
span of hours and days, not minutes, yielding strong implications for market
efficiency in this context. While we cannot causally separate substantive
legal impact from mere revision of beliefs, we do find strong evidence that
there is indeed a “law on the market” effect as measured by the frequency of
abnormal return events, and that these abnormal returns are not immediately
incorporated into prices.
Keywords: event study, supreme court, market efficiency, abnormal
returns, litigation, judicial decision-making
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1. Introduction
On June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States delivered its
opinion in the highly-anticipated bio-patent case of Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). In this case,
the Court considered the important question of whether human genes could
be patented. The defendant in the case, Myriad Genetics, was sued over its
patent claims relating to two genes – BRCA1 and BRCA2 – whose mutations
have been linked to increased risk for breast and ovarian cancer. Relying on
its patent claim, Myriad Genetics had sought to be the exclusive provider
of “BRAC analysis” and “BART analysis” tests used to screen patients for
cancer.
Ultimately, the Court’s decision was seen as a compromise, as it held that
DNA sequences fall outside the definition of patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. §101, but cDNA (complementary DNA) sequences, which do not
occur in nature absent human intervention, may indeed be patented. This
compromise was significant not just for patent law broadly, but more specif-
ically for Myriad’s business model. As displayed in Figure 1, the market
initially “got it wrong.” Fueled in part by inaccurate media reports, in the
initial hours after the opinion was released, market participants interpreted
the Court’s decision as positive for Myriad. In reality, however, the decision
was harmful to Myriad as it resulted in the loss of market exclusivity for
its BRCA testing revenues. Eventually, the stock began to trade down in
the second half of the session as consensus came around to this understand-
ing. Contemporaneous media coverage colloquially described the session as
a “wild ride” and a “market whipsaw.”
As highlighted in Figure 1, Myriad’s stock fell more than 20% over the
two-day window, a significant move even after controlling for the overall mar-
ket. In addition to this significant price change, there was also over a ten-fold
increase in daily volume compared to the prior month’s average. For Myriad,
the actions of the Supreme Court were clearly related to a material revalu-
ation of their stock. But how common are events like these, and when they
do occur, what is the typical magnitude of corresponding market movement?
While scholars have studied the equity market impacts of individual cases or
particular areas of law, none have yet studied a court or market over time
and across areas.
In this paper, we document the frequency and magnitude of abnormal
stock returns following Supreme Court action. We comprehensively review
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Figure 1: Myriad Genetics (MYGN) cumulative abnormal returns from June 13-14, 2013
every case before the Supreme Court of the United States, beginning with
the October 1999 term and ending with the October 2013 term. We identify
all cases where the parties involved are publicly-traded or the legal question
has economic bearing on one or more publicly-traded companies.
Using this expertly-coded subset of cases, we apply event study method-
ology to examine returns around the date of decision and oral argument. For
decisions, which are typically released at a known time during market hours,
we rely on five-minute intraday OHLC data over a two-day window; for oral
arguments, whose transcripts are released same-day but with less regularity
of timing, we rely on daily OHLC data over a 60-day window. While we can-
not separate the measurement of substantive legal impact from mere revision
of prior beliefs, we can identify cases in which at least one of these effects is
present.
On a per-term basis, we find 5.3 cases and 7.8 stocks that exhibit ab-
normal returns after decision; in total, we find 79 out of 211 cases (37%)
exhibit an average abnormal return of 4.4% over a two-session window with
an average |t|-statistic of 2.9. In our analysis of oral arguments, we find that
the magnitude of abnormal returns around oral argument and decision are
strongly rank-correlated, although the returns per se exhibit no dependence.
Finally, we observe that abnormal returns related to Supreme Court decisions
materialize over the span of hours and days, not minutes, with implications
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for market efficiency in this context. We find strong evidence that there is
indeed a “law on the market” effect as measured by the frequency of ab-
normal return events, and that these abnormal returns are not immediately
incorporated into prices.
2. Research Overview
Economists have long been interested in how markets respond to and in-
corporate new information. In finance and law, these questions have typically
been addressed using event study methods applied to price data. Building
on the initial work of [1] and [2], [3] outlines the efficient market hypothe-
sis (EMH). EMH argues that the stock market is informationally efficient,
and thus the price of a security reflects available information. While there
are stronger and weaker versions of EMH, semi-strong EMH implies that
publicly-announced Supreme Court decisions and oral argument transcripts
should be rapidly incorporated into prices.
Supreme Court decisions and oral arguments may add to the information
set related to individual securities, sectors, and markets as a whole. In some
cases, this new information may not be so new, i.e., it may confirm existing
market expectations; for example, in cases where the lower court has ruled
against a firm and market participants strongly believe the Supreme Court
will affirm the prior ruling, then the firm’s stock price should, in theory,
already reflect the decreased valuation. If the Court does affirm the lower
court, then no significant revision of beliefs should occur, and therefore no
significant change in valuation should occur.
In other cases, however, new information may either contradict expec-
tations or collapse a high-entropy state. In the former example, the Court
“surprises” and the market must adjust its expectations. For example, if the
lower court has ruled against a firm and market participants strongly believe
the Supreme Court will affirm the prior standing, then the firm’s stock price
should already reflect the decreased valuation. But if the Supreme Court
then unexpectedly reverses the lower court decision in favor of the firm, the
price should then increase to remove or “undo” the discount created by the
lower court decision. Since beliefs are significantly revised, a proportional
change in valuation should therefore occur.
The most complex case involves “coin-toss” or “high-entropy” cases. Take,
for example, a case in which market participants are perfectly split in their
expectations. One half expect a favorable ruling that will result in a 10%
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increase in the stock; the other half expect an unfavorable ruling that will
result in a 10% decrease in the stock. All else equal, we should then expect
the a 10% abnormal return after decision regardless of whether the decision
is favorable or unfavorable.1
We cannot directly observe participant expectations and information sets.
As a result, we cannot systematically disentangle expectation confirmation,
surprise, and high uncertainty or entropy cases in our sample. When we
measure abnormal price returns after decision or oral argument, we may
therefore be capturing the direct impact of substantive legal change, the
mere revision of beliefs, or both. As documented in [5], this limits our ability
to interpret the “treatment effect” and underlying causality. It does not,
however, limit our ability to document cases of abnormal return themselves.
Furthermore, from a practioner’s perspective, our price-based analysis
is identifying only a subset of events that may present opportunity. For
example, while confirming, surprising, and high-entropy cases may be difficult
to identify using only the underlying security price data, option prices and
volumes may provide a better glimpse into participant beliefs. Similarly,
while we identify potential inefficiencies in underlying security prices, there
are likely many more option-based strategies such as long or short straddles
worth investigation.
Treatment isolation aside, event study methods are the typical approach
used to explore how markets respond to new information. The event study
methodology pioneered in [6] and further outlined in [7], [8], [9] and [10]
is designed to test for the presence of abnormal returns associated after an
event or change in information set. While important work such as [5] has
recently cautioned against inappropriate interpretation of event studies, they
have become a staple of economics and finance, with thousands of examples
across a wide range of data. Classic applications include the exploration of
market reactions to information updating events including announcements
of earnings [11], [12], dividends [13], [14], stock splits [15], [16], mergers [17]
and tender offers [18].
Historically, analysis of abnormal return events has also included the ex-
ploration of third-party or non-market actors or events, such as market re-
1In general, the intrinsic uncertainty or predictability of Supreme Court decisions is still
a very much an open and unexplored question. In related work, several of the authors of
this study have examined the predictability of Supreme Court decisions using algorithmic
approaches [4].
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actions to decisions of the Federal Reserve [19], [20], administrative agencies
[21], [22], [23], [24] legislatures, [25], [26], and elections [27], [28], [29]. Within
the narrow context of litigation and judicial decision-making, a number of
event studies have been carried out in corporate law [30] [31], tax law [32] [33],
patent law [34], environmental law [35], communications law [36], products
liability [37] [38], antitrust [39] [40] and property rights [41].
Collectively, these studies offer evidence that the decisions of legal insti-
tutions and actors impact the securities markets. However, there are some
serious limitations in these prior papers, including limited longitudinal scale
and breadth. Our primary purpose in this research is to address these two
dimensions by evaluating every case decided by the most visible court in the
United States over a fifteen year period.
3. Data
3.1. Supreme Court Data
Although the precise date of decision is often not known in advance,
Supreme Court decisions, much like earnings reports, are anticipated events
that may reveal new information. Unlike earnings events, however, most
finance professionals are not familiar with the process that produces these
decisions.
Supreme Court cases typically involve an appeal from a prior decision.
In the vast majority of cases, one or more lower courts have already heard
claims from the parties involved in a dispute and have issued public deci-
sions. Generally, the Supreme Court may take cases on appeal for a number
of reasons, including appeal to reverse a lower court decision which in some
cases may help resolve inconsistency between federal courts. Since such dis-
putes are already public and typically originate from a prior decision, market
participants can readily form beliefs and adjust valuations if warranted. Fur-
thermore, as required by SEC regulations and the Securities and Securities
Exchange Acts, companies are required to disclose material events, including
pending litigation, in 8-K and annual 10-K reports.
Appeals from lower courts are not automatic or guaranteed, however. A
party may petition the Supreme Court to hear a case; the Court may then
calendar the petition for review in conference. Conferences are held periodi-
cally, and, based on the norms of the Court, if a minimum number of Justices
desire to hear the case, the petition may be granted. At this point, the case
may be docketed for oral argument. Throughout this period, both the parties
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themselves and third-parties, such as business associations or interest groups,
may file briefs arguing for or against the parties. Eventually, oral arguments
are heard, and, in some cases, the Justices may request additional time to
allow the parties to re-argue.
From this point on, market participants anticipate that the Court may
issue an opinion on any designated Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday between
10:00-10:15AM Eastern.2 Realistically, even in the simplest 9-0 majority
cases, the preparation of opinions may take at least a few weeks. In cases
where there are multiple concurring or dissenting opinions, this timeline may
extend to months. Court-watchers therefore know that, once oral arguments
have been heard, they must monitor the Supreme Court press coverage each
day calendared for decisions. These release windows are always during US
open market hours.
As we define it, “law on the market” (LOTM) exists when the action
of a legal institution effects an abnormal return in the price of one or more
publicly-traded companies. In order to identify LOTM events, we reviewed
Supreme Court cases and first classified them into two categories: LOTM
Candidates and Non-Candidates. Much of the Supreme Court’s docket is
filled by cases with little or no direct market relevance. For example, as
a general matter, cases involving criminal procedure, capital punishment
cases, or jury composition impose no obvious discernible economic impact on
publicly-traded firms. Our expert coders reviewed each case, only designating
the case as a LOTM candidate case if the parties or legal ramifications could
plausibly be linked to relevant market participants.
Our prompts took the form of two questions. First, could this decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States plausibly affect publicly-traded
companies or sectors? If so, then which publicly-traded companies or sectors?
We recognize that our event definition and coding do not capture all potential
economic impacts from the Court’s actions. For example, an affected party
might be held privately, might be a non-profit institution, or the economic
consequences might only be understood or apparent over a longer period.
In these instances, we would not be able to identify abnormal returns after
Court actions. Also, despite our best efforts to maximize recall and include
any tangentially-related cases, we acknowledge that we may have failed to
2Given the days of week on which decisions are announced, almost none of our two-
session samples span weekends.
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identify some candidates from the 1,300+ cases we reviewed. Thankfully,
these shortcomings imply that our overall results represent merely a lower
bound, not an upper bound, on the frequency of “law on the market” events.
In total, among the 1,363 total cases reviewed in our sample, we identified
211 candidate LOTM cases plausibly affecting one or more firms or sectors.
3.2. Market Data
Each of our 211 candidate cases is associated with one or more firms or
sectors. For firms, we identify the symbol and exchange at the time of event;
for sectors, we select exchange-traded funds (ETF) from the Select Sector
SPDR family, as they have the longest history and most liquid trading. We
then collect market data around both decision and oral argument for each
case and each symbol. For decision, we retrieve OHLC data at five-minute
intervals for the period one week prior to and one week after the decision.
This provides us with an ample pre-event and post-event estimation window.
For oral arguments, we retrieve OHLC data at daily intervals for the period
one month prior to argument and one month after. In addition, we retrieve
price and volume data for the S&P 500 exchange-traded fund SPY for both
five-minute and daily periods matching each case sample.
It is worth noting that most event studies are performed on just interday,
not intraday, data. Scholars have typically conducted event study analysis
using daily, weekly, or monthly price data. Nearly every event study in law,
and the vast majority of analysis in finance, leverages data with at most
daily frequency. Interday studies, however, face a difficult and unavoidable
tradeoff: either a researcher must rely upon relatively few data points, or
they must collect data over longer durations in order to generate a sufficient
statistical sample. As the estimation windows are extended for sample size,
it becomes more difficult to defend the link between event and measurement.
With every passing day, the chance of confounding events grows. Whether
it is a subsequent earnings announcement, a change in senior management,
updates in the status of a regulatory approval, a merger announcement, or
some other important change, the potential for misidentification and mea-
surement error looms large. As a result, interday studies must attempt to
manually identify confounding factors and attempt to control for them, only
increasing model complexity.
At its core, we believe the problem is one of data, not one of methods.
Scholars in the literature increasingly agree. As noted in [42], “short-horizon
methods are quite reliable and while long-horizon methods have improved,
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serious limitations remain.” We likewise believe that intraday data is the
key to avoiding Type I and II error in the estimation of abnormal returns
around an event with narrow temporal scope. Given that access to granular
price data, including minutely and tick data, has become more affordable,
we have collected our data for decision events based on this premise.
4. Methodology and Results
4.1. Abnormal Returns
In order to test for abnormal returns, we must first select a model of
normal returns. While there are many models for asset pricing and stock
returns,3 our model must satisfy three constraints: (a) stable estimation
for samples with N ≤ 175, as dictated by our five-minute bar data and
windows; (b) simple comparison and communication of results, including
degree of uncertainty or belief; and (c) application across a wide range of firm
sizes, industries, and time periods. Constraints (a) and (b) preclude models
requiring higher-order moments or more sensitive, asymmetric distributions,
such as skewness, kurtosis, or the Variance-Gamma family. Constraint (c)
also counsels against tools like multi-factor models, which require firm size,
industry, and period-specific factors and calibration.
Given these constraints, we select the most common approach in finance
- the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Since our analysis is short-term,
focusing on intra-day timescales, we also take the risk-free rate to be constant.
Critically, throughout the entirety of our study sample, the daily overnight
rate has not exceeded (0.02%). The end result is that CAPM, in our case,
collapses to the simple market model of returns where rf = 0.
Estimating the impact of an event under the market model is detailed
in many papers cited above, and [9] is the most widely-cited across event
study literature; the interested reader is directed there for a conceptual in-
troduction to our methodology. To perform this procedure, we rely on Sun’s
implementation, evReturn in the R package erer; this package was devel-
oped in [35] based upon approaches previously outlined in work such as [6]
and [9].4
3See [43] for a review of candidates.
4Code necessary to replicate this model is available on Github at
https://github.com/mjbommar/law-on-the-market. However, due to terms of ser-
vice associated with some of the stock data, we are not able to make intraday stock data
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Applying this estimation framework to our 211 candidate LOTM cases,
we find that 79 cases (37%) exhibit an average abnormal return of 4.4% over a
two-session window with an average |t|-statistic of 2.9.5 Figure 2 summarizes
the total number of cases and securities, number of candidate cases and
securities, and number of significant cases and securities.6 Treating our tests
of these 211 cases as independent, the probability of observing 79 significant
cases at a p-value threshold of 0.05 by chance is exceedingly small; we can
see this by modeling our aggregate outcome as a binomial distribution with
X ∼ B(N = 211, p = 0.05) and evaluating P(X < 79), which is greater than
1 − 10−407. At the stock-level, we performed 1573 tests with 298 positives;
P(X < 298) is similarly ≈ 1 at > 1− 10−80.
LOTM Candidate Cases - 132
Statistically Signficant 
LOTM Cases - 79
Non-LOTM Cases - 1152 Candidate LOTM Equities - 568 
Statistically Signficant 
LOTM Equities - 118
Figure 2: Distribution of LOTM and Non-LOTM Cases and Securities (1999-2014)
As displayed in Figure 3 below, over our fifteen-year sample, the frequency
of both potential and realized LOTM events has been fairly steady. On an
annual basis, there were an average of 5.3 LOTM cases per term and 7.8
statistically significant LOTM securities. While there is some annual varia-
tion in the number of candidate and significant events, Figure 3 highlights
that most years are fairly close to the average with the October 2009 term
featuring only 1 LOTM case but with the immediately following year of 2010
serving as the largest year with 10 LOTM cases.
publicly available.
5There are at least twenty stocks that are significant against one or more ETFs but
that are not significant against the S&P. All tables and figures are calculated using only
ticker symbols for securities or exchange traded funds which are statistically significant
with respect to the S&P500 index.
6See the Github repository at https://github.com/mjbommar/law-on-the-market for a
complete Table of Cases listing every case for which we detect abnormal returns.
7See, e.g., BinomialCDF[211, 0.05, 79] on Wolfram Alpha.
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Figure 3: Annual Frequency of LOTM Cases (1999-2014)
4.2. Dollar Impact
Returns are not a measure of dollars or wealth, however, and while an
individual or institution may or may not sell the security to realize the gain
or loss, the mark-to-market wealth of individuals and entities does change.
In this study, we observe a wide variety of companies with relevant issues
before the Court. These companies vary especially with respect to market
capitalization, and this range of capitalization impacts the size of the ob-
served returns. Importantly, these variations may mean that a 1% abnormal
return may have very different dollar or wealth impacts on market partici-
pants. Theory suggests that larger, more diversified companies would be less
affected by decisions of equal economic impact than smaller, less diversified
companies. For example, a Court decision affecting revenues of one business
unit should have less impact on a firm with many business units than one
with few, on average.
In order to evaluate these dollar impacts, we calculate the change in equity
value for each of our statistically significant abnormal return events. After
accounting for changes in number of shares outstanding, this is measured
by the difference between market cap at the beginning and end of our event
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windows. Using this approach, we estimate the change in total wealth for
each statistically significant event. In aggregate, law on the market events
exhibit total wealth changes in excess of 148 billion dollars in our sample.
On average, this is 9.91 billion dollars per year, or 1.88 billion per event.
Figure 4 offers the distribution of these wealth changes as a function of time.
Clearly, these events are significant in real dollar terms, not just percentage
returns.
From a dollar impact perspective, the largest event is United States v.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000), a supremacy clause case from the October
1999 term. In this case, the Court held that “regulations regarding gen-
eral navigation watch procedures, crew English language skills and training,
and maritime casualty reporting are preempted by the comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme governing oil tankers.” Among other things, this case was
significant as it limited a set of state oil transport regulations passed in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. After the decision, which relieved oil
transporters from complying with certain state-level regulations, the value of
Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM) increased by more than 23 billion dollars
and the value of Chevron (CVX) by more than 3 billion dollars.
Figure 4: Distribution of Wealth Effects as a Function of Time
4.3. Oral Arguments and Return Factors
We have clearly documented the presence of abnormal return events after
decisions and measured their dollar impact on wealth. But what drives these
abnormal returns? Are they just a function of revision of beliefs alone? Are
there any factors that can foretell these events or their magnitude?
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We investigate these questions through two analyses. First, we assess
excess returns around oral argument, investigating how these correlate with
subsequent post-decision returns. Second, we investigate how factors such
as the area of law or voting patterns impact the presence or magnitude of
abnormal returns. Together, these analyses can provide additional insight to
the case for or against law on the market.
Prior to the date of decision, there are many opportunities for market
participants to incorporate information about judicial activity. These include
lower court decisions, grant of certiorari, filing of amicus briefs, and oral
argument or re-argument. In particular, oral arguments typically receive the
most attention from the press and Court observers. While oral argument
transcripts have been released same-day for almost all arguments, we have
no way to “timestamp” their actual release or general availability to the
public intraday. As a result, we analyze returns around oral argument at
daily frequency, not intraday, and the results are not directly comparable to
our post-decision returns.
In total, we identify 1,168 samples with price data available around oral
argument. We calculate excess return relative to the S&P 500 for (a) the day
before argument to the day after argument, (b) the week before argument to
the week after argument, and (c) the month before argument to the month
after argument. Then, for each of these symmetric daily, weekly, and monthly
windows, we examine the Pearson and Spearman correlation between excess
returns around oral argument and abnormal return post-decision.
As the results in Table 1 demonstrate, most pairwise relationships are
not strongly dependent. For example, all pairwise correlations against the
post-decision abnormal return D per se are below 15%. Looking, however,
at the absolute value of D, i.e., the magnitude of post-decision abnormal
return, paints a different picture. In particular, the relationship between the
magnitudes of oral argument return |A| and post-decision return |D| is much
stronger. Both the Pearson correlation ρ(|A|, |D|) and Spearman correlation
ρs(|A|, |D|) are between 20%-40% for all oral argument windows.
These correlations imply that in a number of instances market partici-
pants incorporate information about the magnitude, but not necessarily the
direction, of the Court’s decision. From a coarser perspective, we also sim-
plified the analysis to a two-by-two matrix capturing up-or-down for oral
argument and decision in table 2. While approximately two-thirds of excess
returns are negative around oral argument windows, the direction of change
at oral argument does not provide significant information for decision; the
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Day Week Month
ρ(A,D) 0.081724 -0.043022 0.060645
ρs(A,D) 0.031031 -0.015607 0.043728
ρ(A, |D|) 0.233393 0.181999 0.180640
ρs(A, |D|) 0.085366 0.071351 0.091160
ρ(|A|, D) 0.122116 0.149385 0.056583
ρs(|A|, D) 0.061151 0.116090 0.051309
ρ(|A|, |D|) 0.386834 0.403502 0.339776
ρs(|A|, |D|) 0.288358 0.192646 0.240447
Table 1: Correlation between excess return around oral argument windows A and post-
decision abnormal return D. ρ is the Pearson product-moment coefficient and ρs is the
Spearman correlation coefficient.
direction of post-decision return is still a coin flip.
D < 0 D ≥ 0
A < 0 0.348630 0.303378
A ≥ 0 0.171447 0.176546
Table 2: Cross-tabulated sign of two-day oral argument and post-decision returns.
One theory is that oral arguments begin to reveal the preferences of indi-
vidual Justices sitting on the Court. If so, then we should see a relationship
between the subsequent voting coalition and the direction or magnitude of
abnormal return. For example, in cases where market participants the Court
issues a unanimous 9−0 decision, there was likely less uncertainty about the
outcome prior to announcement. But in cases where the Court rules 5 − 4,
then the case is likely higher-entropy. Since the entire decision rests on the
decision of one “swing” vote, the outcome is often much more uncertain.
To evaluate this theory, we merged all abnormal return results with data
on the vote margin and duration between argument and decision, which is a
proxy to potential dissent or uncertainty. We first calculated the Pearson and
Spearman correlation coefficients between (a) the estimate and vote margin
and (b) the absolute value of estimate and vote margin. For (a), we observed
Pearson and Spearman coefficients of -0.03 and 0.01 with p-values > 0.2 for
both measures. For (b), we observed Pearson and Spearman coefficients of
-0.04 and -0.06 with p-values of 0.2 and 0.02, respectively. Next, we analyzed
the mean, median, and standard deviation of estimates conditioned by vote
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margin; with the exception of cases with zero vote margin, an exceedingly rare
case, no differences were observed between other vote configurations. Given
the very small sample size of these “tied” vote events (<1%), we cannot read
much into this result.
Next, we merged the abnormal return results with information on the
relevant SPDR Sector index (XLU, XLV, XLI, XLF, XLY, XLE, XLB, XLP,
XLK) and the SCDB petitioner/respondent codes. While not all businesses
are “confined” to a single sector, the SPDR Sector indices represent an ac-
cepted market-based definition. The SCDB petitioner and respondent codes,
while based arbitrarily on historical Supreme Court data and researcher
choice, are much more fine-grained. First, we evaluated the means, medians,
standard deviations, and IQRs of events based on the SPDR sector index. We
find no statistically significant differences between sectors for the estimate
(including direction); Evaluating the absolute value of estimate, i.e., esti-
mate magnitude, we also find no significant differences. In summary, within
our sample’s standard errors, abnormal returns do not vary significantly by
sector.
We then evaluated the means, medians, standard deviations, and IQRs of
events conditioned by petitioner and respondent coding. Here, we find many
more interesting and potentially significant relationships despite the smaller
sample sizes by petitioner or respondent code. For example, some petitioners
have significantly left-skewed or negative distributions for abnormal return,
including the Department/Secretary of Agriculture, trucking companies, bro-
kers or stock exchanges, and cable TV providers. Conversely, a number of
petitioners have a significantly right-skewed or positive abnormal return dis-
tribution, including environmental organizations, sellers or vendors, or the
FDA. While sample sizes within our sample alone are too small for statistical
significance, these results corroborate extant research on the topic and justify
further research across lower court rulings.
Above, we provide substantial evidence for the existence of “law on the
market” events, measuring both their frequency and magnitude. We also
investigate returns around the most salient information event prior to de-
cision - oral argument - and how these returns correlate with subsequent
post-decision returns. While we cannot measure the intrinsic uncertainty of
the Court’s decision as a baseline, we do find a surprisingly low correlation
between the direction of oral argument and decision returns. Market partic-
ipants seem to understand the magnitude or importance of cases, but do no
better than a coin flip when it comes to the actual direction of return post-
15
decision. This observation does not align with the accuracy rates exhibited
by experts in [44] or algorithms in [4], [44].
4.4. Information Incorporation and Market Efficiency
To further investigate market efficiency, we turn our attention to the
timing of abnormal return. In almost all instances, the Court’s decision is
announced between 10:00-10:15AM ET. Does the market “digest” the opinion
by 10:30AM, 11:00AM, or even end of day? We approach this problem by
evaluating the abnormal return time series within our five-minute OHLC bar
data, calculating the percentage of total abnormal return that is realized
over time. In the absence of other new firm-specific information, perfect
market efficiency would suggest that this time series should jump to 100% in
the seconds or minutes after the Court’s opinion is released. Recalling our
motivating Myriad example, however, cautions against this assumption. But
is the Myriad case anomalous or par for the course?
Figure 5 offers a portrait of signal incorporation across all significant
LOTM events in our sample. Each statistically significant security-event
pair is displayed on the rows in the y-axis, while the columns along the x-
axis correspond to each five minute interval over the two-day window. The
color of each cell corresponds to the percent of total abnormal return that
has been realized up to that five-minute interval. We denote key times, e.g.,
the market opening, approximate 10:00AM ET release, the market close, etc.
along the bottom of the x-axis.
Figure 5 demonstrates substantial variation in the rate at which market
participants respond to Supreme Court decisions. One striking feature, how-
ever, is how little abnormal return is observed on the first day of trading.
In many cases, the abnormal return primarily materializes “overnight”, i.e.,
between the first day’s close and second day’s open. Given the complexity of
Court opinions and the timing of thorough press analysis, this may not be
so surprising. Even in incredibly salient and public cases such as the “Oba-
macare” case (NFIB v. Sibelius) and Myriad, we observe initially incorrect
or delayed price incorporation.
Market participants employing high-frequency and algorithmic trading
have focused on information events such as central bank announcements
[20], [45], consumer sentiment data release [46], and other common news
announcements [47] [48]. In extreme examples, the window for information
incorporation has been reduced to mere milliseconds [49]. The actions of
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Courts, however, do not reveal the behavioral signature of an information-
ally efficient market with rapid signal incorporation.
5. Case Studies
Each case has a story and it would be impossible to do complete justice to
all of the events in our sample. However, in order to provide the reader with
more context, we describe four significant cases which collectively involve
questions tort law, preemption, environmental law, administrative law, and
patent law. In Figure 6, we display the two-day time series of cumulative
abnormal returns, starting at the 9:30AM ET open on the day of decision
and concluding at 4:00PM on the day following the Court’s decision.
The first pane in Figure 6, Limelight Networks v. Akamai Tech, 134
S.Ct. 2111 (2014), represented the largest two-day cumulative abnormal re-
turn Limelight’s stock posting a cumulative abnormal return of over 25%.
The patent infringement case considered whether, under the specific circum-
stances present in the case, an infringement claim could be sustained even
if no direct party had committed patent infringement. The Court held that
the answer was no, essentially “saving” Limelight Networks (LLNW) from
potential bankruptcy. The stock experienced an almost immediate abnormal
return of 5%, finishing the first session up nearly 15%. By the end of the
second day, the stock had logged over an additional 10% abnormal return.
The second pane in Figure 6, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458 (2009), represented a substantial gain
for Coeur Mining, Inc. (CDE). In Coeur Alaska, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a challenge brought by a series of environmental groups who sought to
block the disposal of tailings from a former gold mine. Coeur Alaska had ob-
tained a permit to dispose of 4.5 million tons of tailings in a local lake located
inside a national park. Environmental organizations challenged the permit,
arguing it violated the Clean Water Act. The Supreme Court rejected the
challenge, upholding the permit and thereby enriching its parent company.
Within hours, the Coeur stock (CDE) traded up 10% and finished the day
by posting cumulative abnormal returns around 15%. The following day saw
some small additional gains, but most of the returns had been established in
the first trading day.
The third pane in Figure 6 shows the abnormal return related to Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), a case originating when “smokers
of ‘light’ cigarettes filed suit, alleging that cigarette manufacturers violated
18
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the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA) by fraudulently advertis-
ing that their ‘light’ cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine than regular
brands.” The Supreme Court considered whether Maine’s statute allowing
plaintiffs to pursue a fraud claim was preempted by federal law. The Court
ultimately held that “a state law prohibiting deceptive tobacco advertising
was not preempted by a federal law regulating cigarette advertising,” thus
allowing the state tort claim to proceed. Following this Court announce-
ment, Altria’s (MO) stock immediately trended down, followed by lateral
trading for much of the date of decision. In the following day, Altria’s stock
continued to decline relative to the market as the financial implications of
the Court’s decision began to become more widely understood. Ultimately,
at the close of the two-day window, the stock had experienced a negative
cumulative abnormal return of nearly 9%.
In the fourth pane in Figure 6, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903 (2001), the Court considered a challenge to the En-
vironmental Protection Agency’s National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAAQS). Among other things, the NAAQS is responsible for regulating
permissible amounts of ozone and particulate matter. In response to re-
vision in national ambient air quality standards, a series of organizations,
including the American Trucking Association, challenged the EPA, arguing
the enabling statute had impermissibly delegated legislative power to the
EPA. While the Court’s decision was mixed with respect to substantive law
impact, the market’s reaction was clearly negative. General Motors (GM),
at the time, the largest automaker, and Honda Motors (HMC), also traded
down over the next two sessions.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we document the frequency and magnitude of abnormal
stock returns following Supreme Court action. We comprehensively review
every case before the Supreme Court of the United States from the 1999
term through the 2013 term, identifying the subset of cases where the parties
involved are publicly-traded or the legal question has economic bearing on
one or more publicly-traded companies. Using this expertly-coded subset
of cases, we examine abnormal stock returns around the date of decision
and oral argument. We find that “law on the market” events are persistent
over time, relatively frequent, and often large in both percentage return and
dollar terms. While we cannot separate the measurement of substantive legal
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impact from mere revision of prior beliefs, we can identify cases in which at
least one of these effects is present. Furthermore, in our analysis of returns
around oral argument and the rate at which abnormal returns are realized,
we find evidence of market inefficiency relative to other common information
events.
While this paper provides the first broad, longitudinal study of markets
and courts, there is ample room for improvement. Future research would ex-
tend this analysis to both higher and lower frequency price data. At higher
frequency, an evaluation of order book and tick data around decision an-
nouncement will provide substantially more evidence towards information
efficiency and market attention to these events. At lower frequency, a more
holistic view of disputes, beginning with the original filing in state or Federal
court, can provide more information about how market participants perceive
court activity and revise their beliefs as new information becomes available.
We can also incorporate option price and volume data, where available, to
better understand participant beliefs and the implied case uncertainty. As
researchers increasingly identify law and finance as an interconnected system-
of-systems [50], we look forward to more research and attention to “law on
the market” phenomena.
In conclusion, this paper has sketched a first portrait of the law on the
market phenomena. Evaluating the population of cases decided in recent
terms of the Supreme Court of the United States, we identify a substantial
number of cases where the price of one or more legally implicated, publicly-
traded companies exhibit significant abnormal returns after Supreme Court
decision. Furthermore, these abnormal returns are realized on timescales that
suggest delays in information incorporation. We look forward to additional
interest and research in event-driven arbitrage opportunities and increasing
market efficiency in this space.
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